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T
oday’s strategic environment 
features rapid technological 
change within interactively 
complex systems. New tech-
nologies are increasingly accessible to 
more and more actors, leading to a sense 
that we are falling behind our adversar-
ies, or at least failing to maintain our 
“technological advantage.” The 2018 
National Defense Strategy, for example, 
notes the “drive to develop new tech-
nologies is relentless,” necessitating 
“changes to industry culture, invest-
ment sources, and protection across the 
National Security Innovation Base.”3
Over the past several years, the DOD 
has tried to adapt to this challenging 
reality by establishing new organiza-
tions, such as the Defense Innovation 
Unit and the Joint Artificial Intelligence 
Center, to more quickly and effectively 
leverage emerging commercial technolo-
gies. The Department of the Navy also 
established NavalX and a network of 
Tech Bridges to help maintain our tech-
nical edge.4 These organizations have 
held a variety of well-publicized “pitch” 
and “industry” days and “H4D” (hack-
ing for defense) events. This strong 
emphasis on technology, however, can 
lead people to draw the conclusion 
that technological innovation matters 
more than tactical and organizational 
capabilities and competencies and our 
Marines’ ability to think creatively and 
critically and act decisively. One need 
look no further than May 1940, when 
the German military defeated a tech-
nologically superior French military in 
a matter of six weeks, to realize this 
assumption is not accurate.
Encouragingly, however, the newest 
Marine Corps doctrinal publication, 
MCDP 1-4, Competition, reinforces 
some important themes from the recent-
ly published MCDP 7, Learning, both of 
which are natural extensions of FMFM 
1, Warfighting.5 MCDP 1-4 identifies 
education as “a primary method for Ma-
rines to sustain competitive advantage 
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It is not always true that the organization with the 
newest or most equipment wins the competition. 
Sometimes the side that is able to combine adequate 
material with innovative ideas becomes the winner.1
—MCDP 1-4 
Maneuver warfare requires intelligent leaders at all 
levels who possess a bias for intelligent action. Suc-
cess in warfare depends on Marines developing an in-
tellectual edge to accurately recognize cues, quickly 
make sense of information, and respond effectively.2
—MCDP 7
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budget forecasts trending negative and 
the inherent difficulty in keeping up 
with technological change, education 
will likely play an even more important 
role moving forward.7 MCDP 1-4 also 
reminds us of the importance of identi-
fying and protecting our own weakness-
es from being exploited, even as we try 
to exploit those of our adversaries. Thus, 
while well-intentioned, the DOD’s em-
phasis on technological innovation must 
be tempered by the fact that our most 
challenging and likely adversary, China, 
is integrated in global supply chains and 
our research and development, which it 
leverages to acquire nascent technolo-
gies with minimal investment or risk. 
However, even though the Chinese 
can access our intellectual property at 
a rapid rate, they cannot easily erode 
our ability to think, and for a variety 
of organizational, historical, societal, 
and institutional reasons, it is difficult 
for Chinese culture to embrace creative 
and innovative thinking. Thus, for us, 
prioritizing education and thinking in 
our approach to competition becomes 
even more important, as it exploits a 
known weak point for China, which 
tends to value conformity.8
This article does not intend to sug-
gest that technology can be ignored or 
does not matter, but rather to swing 
the pendulum back toward focusing on 
people first.9 After all, it is our Marines 
that will ultimately have to develop ways 
to incorporate and effectively employ 
any new technologies, and the intel-
lectual readiness and mental agility of 
our leaders is essential to fulfilling our 
maneuver warfare philosophy, which is 
dependent on leaders who understand it 
and can take intelligent initiative based 
off intent. In this article, we hope to 
help explain some of the ideas and con-
cepts MCDP 1-4 identifies as essential 
for leaders to master to lead organiza-
tions through long-term competition by 
using a few examples from the maneuver 
warfare movement and Gen Al Gray’s 
leadership. We also identify some of the 
individual and organizational learning 
mechanisms needed to ensure we have 
the leaders capable of mastering these 
concepts and emphasize the value of 
reading to our profession and our identi-
ties as Marines. We conclude by noting 
the vital role leaders play in inspiring 
an enthusiasm for learning at the in-
dividual level and nurturing a culture 
that enables it at an organizational 
level. We hope our discussion can help 
both in understanding some learning 
mechanisms the Corps can nurture and 
in explaining how these mechanisms 
can foster better learning (and better 
competing) organizations. 
Leading Learning Organizations for 
Competition 
MCDP 1-4 identifies education as a 
key enabler of innovation and central 
to creating and sustaining competitive 
advantage.11 Recognizing the need for 
holistic thinking, MCDP 1-4 explains 
that in order for Marine leaders to lead 
the Corps through “cycles of innova-
tion,” they must master topics such as 
organizational learning, change man-
agement, and the difference between 
sustaining and disruptive innovations.12
MCDP 1-4, however, defines organi-
zational learning in a fundamentally 
passive manner. Organizations must 
not only sense and respond to chang-
es in the environment but also have 
mechanisms and capabilities in place 
to proactively search for and generate 
new knowledge. Additionally, they must 
be able to strike a balance between “the 
exploration of new possibilities and the 
exploitation of old certainties”13 and not 
simply know the difference between the 
two.14 Experimentation, maintaining 
open minds, and education play key 
roles in organizations not only remain-
ing adaptive and able to refine existing 
processes and practices but also agile 
and able to simultaneously pursue in-
novation. 
Gen Gray maintained this balance, 
built and enabled mechanisms for indi-
vidual and organizational learning, and 
changed the Marine Corps’ warfight-
ing philosophy by taking a bottom-up 
approach that challenged and inspired 
even the most junior Marines to take 
education and professional self-study se-
riously. He empowered them to develop 
and exercise the judgment necessary to 
act intelligently and decisively based 
on commander’s intent. As a result, his 
Marines felt they were helping build 
something new and were intrinsically 
motivated by a professional calling and 
their identity as Marines. They claimed 
ownership of the movement and served 
as apostles who not only helped test and 
refine the maneuver philosophy but also 
helped generate the enthusiasm and mo-
mentum necessary to broaden the base 
of the movement. Gen Gray did so, in 
part, by emphasizing experimentation, 
testing the limits of theories, destigma-
tizing failure, and valuing ideas (even 
from outsiders) over rank and titles.
Experimentation and Learning to Fail. 
When Gen Gray took over as CG, 2d 
MarDiv, he established the Maneuver 
Warfare Board as a clearinghouse for 
maneuver ideas and as an experimen-
tal outfit to test them. Marines read 
articles about maneuver ideas and then 
discussed them in small groups and 
applied them to different warfighting 
functions. Their different perspectives, 
based on different experiences, yielded 
different insights that—when external-
ized and recombined—helped refine the 
maneuver tactics and philosophy of the 
division. The Marines then tested these 
ideas in the field in increasingly larger 
exercises, culminating in division-wide 
“free-play” or “force-on-force” exercises 
at Fort Pickett. In contrast to scripted 
scenarios, these exercises more realisti-
“In the conditions of 
modern life, this rule 
is absolute: the race 
which does not value 
trained intelligence is 
doomed. Not all your 
heroism, not all your so-
cial charm, not all your 
wit, not all your victo-
ries on land or sea, can 
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cally recreated combat conditions, and 
commanders had to actively compete 
against and outwit a thinking enemy 
(i.e., their peers). Whereas scripted sce-
narios tend to foster a risk averse, “box 
checking” mentality, these exercises 
fostered open-ended competition that 
spurred new and innovative ideas. Self-
study, the Maneuver Warfare Board, 
and these exercises served as mecha-
nisms for generating new tactics and 
insights as opposed to simply reacting 
to changes in the environment. This 
is imperative to sustaining our com-
petitive advantage and not ceding the 
initiative to our adversaries.
Recognizing that failure is inherent 
in experimentation and in order to miti-
gate fears of failure, Gen Gray empha-
sized process over result. He was always 
more concerned about why a Marine 
did something rather than with what he 
did. Marines needed to practice making 
decisions under uncertain, ambiguous 
conditions and learn from their mis-
takes. This helped facilitate learning 
at both the individual and organiza-
tional level, as feedback from failures 
and experiments nurtures creativity and 
builds a greater capacity to learn—from 
both individual experiences and those of 
others. Additionally, Gray’s bottom-up 
approach enhanced his Marines’ com-
mitment to, and trust in, the group and 
positively reinforced their enthusiasm 
for professional self-study. 
Openness to ideas. Part of learning 
from failure is having the humility and 
courage to admit you are wrong, or your 
ideas could be improved. MCDP 1-4 
notes the importance of mental flex-
ibility, humility, and questioning our 
assumptions to sustaining our competi-
tive advantage or developing new ones.15
Gen Gray emphasized the importance 
of ideas over rank and titles by having 
his Marines remove their rank insig-
nia during after-action reviews and by 
calling on junior Marines first so they 
would not be pitted against their lead-
ers. Cultivating this type of open envi-
ronment in an organization ordinarily 
imbued with tradition and hierarchy 
was an essential part of cultivating criti-
cal thinking and judgment. Similarly, 
Gen Gray and others in the maneuver 
warfare movement actively sought and 
valued the opinions of others, including 
(and maybe especially) a unique mix 
of outsiders, such as politicians, con-
gressional staffers, journalists, military 
reformers, and officers from other ser-
vices. While difficult, this is essential 
for building an organizational culture 
that encourages innovation.
Learning for Competition
Technology is causing ever increasing 
rates of change that are not only affect-
ing every aspect of our lives but also 
changing the character of war. Since 
it is virtually impossible to keep pace 
with the rapid changes in technology, 
developing and maintaining intellectual 
readiness—our intellectual edge—is of 
paramount importance to Marines who 
must observe, orient, decide, and act 
quickly. This enables them to survive in 
the face of unexpected threats and chal-
lenges and operate from a position of 
advantage against a thinking adversary. 
To get to the point where every Marine 
is intellectually ready, the entire Marine 
Corps must be oriented on fostering this 
mental mindset. In the 1980s, Gen Gray 
fostered a learning environment at in-
creasingly larger commands, and then as 
Commandant, that provided the spark 
for Marines to pursue personal lifelong 
learning and professional development. 
These Marines, in turn, helped inform 
and refine the maneuver philosophy by 
taking intelligent initiative, thus form-
ing a virtuous cycle of individual and 
organizational learning. As Comman-
dant, Gen Gray institutionalized this 
embrace of education and learning by 
founding Marine Corps University, 
increasing education opportunities for 
enlisted Marines, and publishing the 
first Commandant’s Professional Reading 
List. We must return to this intellectu-
ally stimulating environment to truly 
enable our Marines to develop and hone 
the intellectual edge that will give us 
the advantage against any opponent.
One of the most basic, yet useful 
and effective, ways to develop and hone 
an intellectual edge is by reading. Not 
only does reading help build vocabulary, 
comprehension, and awareness, but it 
also gives us something that is irreplace-
able in the profession of arms—vicari-
ous experience. The profession of arms 
cannot be practiced daily even though 
the stakes for failure are so high. How-
ever, reading provides us with vicarious 
experiences that form the basis of the 
wisdom and judgment our profession 
requires. We cannot always choose our 
experiences or when we can actually 
“I often noted ...  that the primary ‘weapon’ that offi-
cers possess remains their minds ... [and] that books 
provide the ‘ammunition’ for this weapon ... I wanted 
to impart a simple lesson: a properly schooled officer 
never arrives on a battlefield for the first time, even if 
he has never actually trod the ground, if that officer 
has read wisely to acquire the wisdom of those who 
have experienced war in times past.” 16
—LtGen Paul K. Van Riper
... developing and main-
taining ... our intellec-
tual edge—is of para-
mount importance to 
Marines ...
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practice our profession, but we can 
choose the vicarious experiences we 
seek. 
People have been fighting for mil-
lennia and writing about it for at least 
the last couple thousand years. Reading 
enables us to take advantage of all the 
hard-won lessons learned over time. An 
old Chinese adage says wise men learn 
from other people’s mistakes, average 
men learn from their own, and fools 
learn from neither. Reading about how 
military professionals successfully or 
unsuccessfully dealt with the impact 
of new or even existing technologies 
on the character of warfare is especially 
useful. Understanding what these tech-
nological capabilities are and how they 
will impact warfare are two of the most 
difficult tasks facing military profes-
sionals and require constant study and 
monitoring. Not keeping up and al-
lowing events around us to outpace our 
ability to understand their impact is 
malpractice in our profession. 
Reading is also valuable because of 
what it does for our minds. Just as physi-
cal exercise strengthens our muscles and 
tendons to enable us to better deal with 
physical stressors, reading strengthens 
the synapses and dendrites in our brains 
to better deal with mental stressors. 
Reading about how others have dealt 
with challenges does not actually pro-
vide us with specific answers, but it does 
help us much more readily come up 
with answers on our own. It is like a 
chess player who has played thousands 
of games and has also read about many 
others.17 Without conscious thought, 
all that combined experience comes 
together in the player’s mind to form 
a filter through which the player sifts 
the current game and formulates solu-
tions. Adequate opportunities to learn 
the relevant cues in a given situation, 
which reading provides, is a necessary 
condition for the application of this 
kind of skilled intuitive judgment.18
Reading about our profession is es-
sential, but it is also important to cast 
our net widely and build intellectual 
range. MCDP 1-4 notes the importance 
of multi-disciplinary reading and edu-
cating ourselves beyond the study of 
war and warfighting to broaden our 
understanding of the larger context of 
competition and how the Marine Corps 
contributes to it.19 Doing so also in-
creases our intellectual range, which 
is invaluable in dealing with constant 
change in the operating environment. 
In today’s increasingly complex world, 
Marines will be called upon to apply 
knowledge from one domain or expe-
rience to entirely new ones that might 
have previously seemed unrelated. De-
veloping intellectual range also helps us 
avoid complacency and settling for what 
we think is “good enough.” Constant 
change means that what worked before 
likely will not work again. As a result, 
we must understand as much as pos-
sible all the things that could impact 
the next fight. This is even more true 
today because our most likely adversar-
ies have a much wider definition of what 
constitutes warfare. We will face things 
in the next fight that are not yet com-
mon knowledge or even considered to 
be a part of what we generally consider 
warfare. Constantly challenging our as-
sumptions, not believing we have come 
up with all the answers, and remaining 
open to new ideas and methods are now 
more essential than ever. We have never 
been good at predicting what the next 
fight will look like, but the key is not 
being too wrong and then having the 
mental agility to recognize new chal-
lenges and adapt quickly. Intellectual 
range enables this kind of mental agility. 
Reading need not be a solitary or 
onerous activity but instead should drive 
and be driven by professionally fulfilling 
interactions with other Marines. In his 
foreword to MCDP 1-4, Gen Berger 
encourages us to debate the publica-
tion. Similarly, Gen Gray encouraged 
the formation of professional study 
groups that met after hours to discuss 
warfare and their profession. Perhaps 
even more importantly, he recognized 
the importance leadership to the imple-
mentation of the professional military 
reading program he established: “Lead-
ers should implement the program in 
such a way that Marines are encouraged 
and motivated to read and do not view 
professional reading as a troublesome 
requirement.”20
Conclusion
As some these examples of Gen Gray 
demonstrate, leadership underpins both 
organizational learning and inspiring 
personal lifelong professional develop-
ment. Gen Gray actively combatted the 
anti-intellectual current in the Marine 
Corps and made reading and self-study 
an expectation. FMFM 1 notes educa-
tion is a “a continuous, progressive pro-
cess of development,”22 not a destina-
tion. Leaders, especially senior officers, 
also need to make themselves accessible 
to junior Marines, engage them, partici-
pate in activities with them, and provide 
them the top cover to experiment and 
even make and learn from mistakes. 
“Any one who has done any thinking, even a little bit, 
knows that it is painful. It is hard work—in fact the 
very hardest that human beings are ever called upon 
to do. It is fatiguing, not refreshing ... Far from trying to 
make the whole process painless from beginning to 
end, we must promise them the pleasure of achieve-
ment as a reward to be reached only through travail.” 21
—Mortimer Adler
Reading about our pro-
fession is essential, but 
it is also important to 
cast our net widely ...
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Senior leaders giving attention to ju-
nior Marines is the oxygen that will 
ensure the initial spark to pursue life-
long learning flares bigger and brighter 
and continues to burn. It is also integral 
to enhancing their commitment to the 
group and strengthening their identity 
as Marines.23 Requirements may pro-
vide some external motivation, coerce 
a grudging obedience, and increase the 
aptitude of some Marines. However, 
increasing requirements is also likely to 
dampen the enthusiasm of many others 
and thus undermine the flaring of outli-
ers and new ideas critical to maintain-
ing our competitive advantage while 
also failing to appeal to our Marines’ 
identity and professional calling to be 
the best.
MCDP 1-4 underscores and seeks 
to explain the struggle between oppos-
ing sides in competition. While not 
explicitly mentioned, education and 
maintaining our intellectual edge will 
also be a struggle, albeit of a slightly 
different sort. Technology offers the al-
lure of silver bullet solutions and quick 
fixes, but education and individual and 
organizational learning make no such 
promises. They take effort—even pain-
ful effort. Change in organizations is 
oftentimes a messy process that takes 
the efforts of many over a long period 
of time. Unfortunately, there are no 
shortcuts to change and maintaining 
our competitive advantage. It is a con-
tinuous process that will undoubtedly 
feature some false starts, dead ends, and 
detours along the way. Thankfully, we 
need not embark on this journey alone 
and can discuss and debate this new 
MCDP and the Marine Corps’ role 
in competition with each other, as the 
Commandant has directed.
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